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Executive Summary
“There cannot be any question that the underground economy is a real phenomenon with important
implications that deserve attention and study."
Vito Tanzi
Measuring the Shadow Economy in Bulgaria
GDP accounts are customarily compiled in several alternative ways, each focusing on aggre-
gating transactions in different ways, but all (at least in theory) adding to the same total. Two of
the most common aggregations are that focused on expenditures (based on the standard national in-
come accounting identity of C + I + G + X-M) and that based on revenues, or incomes. The two
methods should, of course, add to the same number since they measure different sides of the same
activity: what money people receive on the one side, and what they do with it on the other.
However, Bulgarian GDP statistics using revenue as the approach
give growth rates 2 percentage points lower than the expenditure approach for 1998 and 1999. In other
words, data based on what people actually spend show growth rates of 5.4% (1998) and 4.4% (1999),
while official figures based on revenues are 3.5% and 2.4%, respectively. This is evidence that there are
underreported incomes. It is of interest not only for statistical but also for economic policy purposes
to have more detailed information about the discrepancies between official statistics and activities not
covered by the official statistical system. It is particularly interesting to know the size and structure of
unreported, hidden economic activities, or what has come to be called the “shadow economy.” Currently
published estimates of the size of the shadow economy vary from 20 to 25% of officially measured GDP,
implying that there is a far larger issue than that implied by the differential growth rates cited above.
The objective of this study is to estimate the size of the informal sector, its struc-
ture, the incentives for its development and its effect on the economic growth and the com-
petitiveness of the Bulgarian economy. Two different methods were used to get results
that are compatible for international comparisons; also, alternative calculations allow a range
of estimates which can help to balance the methodological weaknesses of the individual ap-
proaches: the modified (indirect) Physical Input Approach based on energy/electricity con-
sumption data, and the (direct) Microeconomic Approach based on firm level survey data.
Five hundred thirty firms are covered by the survey taken from the following sec-
tors: wholesale and retail trade, transport, construction, mechanical and engineering, food
and drinks production, chemical industry, textile and knitwear production, tourism and agri-
culture. These sectors account for 56% of total GDP, and while limited resources ne-
cessitated a smaller sample than would be desired under conditions of unlimited fund-
ing, some results are quite interesting and indicate the need for further investigation.
The study not only provided estimates of the size of the informal
economy but also allowed a basis for analyzing some of the most important aspects of its underlying
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structure and the incentives for its growth. Of particular interest are effects of the tax and social insur-
ance system, effects of labor contracting and wage level as well as the effects of administrative costs.
Results of the Modified Physical Input Approach
The basic rationale of Physical Input Approaches to measuring the size of the shadow economy is that
energy consumption (electricity, plus other sources) in a given country is proportional to total economic
activity and any change in energy consumption which does not correspond to changes in the measured
total activity level of the country indicates a change in the size of the shadow economy. These results
provide useful indicators of changes in the shadow economy over time, but cannot be used to quantify the
absolute size of the shadow economy since this depends on an initial estimate of the size of the shadow
economy in the base year. This estimate is necessarily arbitrary to some degree in the absence of specific
micro-level data allowing definition of an explicit relationship between energy use and economic activity.
Results show that the Bulgarian shadow economy in 1998 declined below the estimated base year (1989)
share of 30%. According to our calculations the share of the shadow economy in 1998 GDP in Bulgaria
was 22%. The largest shares were observed in 1990 (32.2%) and 1996 (34.4%), declining thereafter.
Results of the Microeconomic Approach
The survey performed provided a description of some of the factors important
in promoting shadow economy activities as well as two different direct indica-
tors of its size: one based on tax evasion and one on unreported wages.
The Microeconomic Approach takes into consideration the business environment insofar as it is the
result of legislation, government action and institutional gaps and the response of the individual
firms to these factors. The general economic environment has a serious impact on economic ac-
tivities, particularly the tax and social insurance system and employment and wage conditions.
The survey shows that most companies do not use bank credit for initial investments as is the practice in
developed market economies. Personal savings comprise 65% of initial investments, bank credit accounts
for only 18%, and financial resources available through international programs account for less than 3%.
Almost 70% of the enterprises prefer paying for inputs and other costs in cash. Nineteen per-
cent cite the greater freedom that they have with this form of payment, and 14% of the sam-
ple cite low quality of banking services and the higher costs of payments through banks. How-
ever it is clear that the high percentage of cash payments facilitates non -reporting of economic
activities. This is supported by the observation that the companies (66%) work without in-
voices. The costs saved by following this practice reach approximately 24% of turnover.
One of the key issues cited by respondents for insufficient business growth in Bulgaria is license
and permission procedure. Business attitudes towards licensing and permission requirements are ex-
tremely negative. However, only 1.5% of the sample answer that they operate without legal li-
censes, showing that the risk of sanctions is high. The average cost (state fees plus consultants’
and lawyers’ pay) of obtaining a license is estimated at 14.5% of companies’ monthly turnovers.
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In summary, the survey shows a marked preference of firms for irregular practices, which
facilitate tax evasion, while the high proportion using licenses indicates that, though many
companies operate in the officially reported economy at least to some extent, it is ob-
vious that they avoid reporting some proportion of their activities. The following two
sections describe preliminary estimates of the extent to which this actually occurs.
Evidence from tax and social insurance payments
The taxes that are most frequently evaded are the value added tax (VAT) and social security payments.
Payroll taxes and the personal income taxes are also near at the top of the list of the most frequently
evaded taxes. The survey show that almost 17% of corporate tax is evaded by purchasing fictitious
invoices. Total tax evasion can be estimated at 33% of GDP according to sample-based calculations.
Evidence from labor contracting and wages
Between 13% and 15% of those sampled reported hiring people without any contract during the
1997-99 period, as well as during their first accounting year. This practice allows firms to avoid
the cost of pension and health care taxes on their officially contracted employees. There is a
tendency for growth in the total number of the employed without any contract over the 1997-
99 period. In 1999 the total number of employed fell by over 14%, while at the same time
the number of employed without any contract increased by 22%. This demonstrates a clear ten-
dency for substitution in employment to avoid contracts. The results show that approximately
3% of employed people (ca. 80 000) are not legally registered. Therefore the actual unemploy-
ment rate for 1999 seems to be lower than the National Statistical Institute figures indicate.
The agriculture and the trade sectors show the largest share of workers without a contract, while
the service sector shows the smallest (0.5%). The survey shows that the salaries actually paid were
higher than reported wages (average 230 BGN) by 10% to 50%. Most firms hide around 34 -35%
of their labor costs. The high level of avoidance is a testament to the very high total tax bur-
den in reported wages. Both employers and workers have an interest in avoiding these payments.
Conclusions
This study has shown that though the size of the shadow economy has declined from its peaks in the
mid 1990’s, it remains a sizable portion of the Bulgarian economy. While in many ways shadow activ-
ities have the potential to be dynamic growth sectors, bringing them into official economy would help
spread the burden of social programs more broadly. However, it is clear that the current level of taxa-
tion and administrative costs is regarded as so high that an attempt to impose these taxes on all would
result in the elimination of many shadow activities rather than bringing them into the official economy.
Accordingly, one clear lesson is that improved tax collection must be coupled with reduced taxes and
deregulation. The size of the shadow economy is also of interest to policy-makers seeking to promote
growth. Our results show that a substantial portion of the response to policy initiatives is effectively
hidden from the official view. Thus, an ability to correctly estimate the size and structure of the shadow
economy will not only provide more accurate statistics but can help improve growth policies as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION - DEFINITION OF SHADOW ECONOMY (SE)
AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
ESTIMATION OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY IN BULGARIA
It has been reported in the popular press that statisticians assume in their analyses ap-
proximately 9 trillion USD of world-wide output is not reported, largely due to the existence
of the shadow economy. Friedrich Schneider concludes that shadow activity is nearly 15% of
the officially reported GDP. His assumptions are the result of research carried out in 76 devel-
oped and emerging economies. This shows that the informal sector can be as important as
the official economy, especially when it accompanies the economic development of the transi-
tion countries. According to an estimate made by Johnson, Kaufman and Zodia-Lobaton the
shadow economy in the transition countries varies between 7 - 43% for the period 1989-1993.
There are many causes for the existence of the shadow economy, but some of the most important
can be readily identified. These are high tax burdens, weak banking systems, business regulations and
legislation, in-efficiency of government institutions and high unemployment rates. The shadow economy
tends to be greater in the developing and transition countries due to more corruption and low incomes.
To date there is no precise definition of the shadow economy. Friedrich Schneider and Do-
minic Enste define it as a multitude of activities that are not reported by the official statistics. Ac-
cording to Feige the development of the shadow economy is due to regulations and rules imposed on
business by the state. De Soto has also contributed to the explanation of the shadow economy phe-
nomenon. He holds that the quality of regulations as well as their enforcement are of great impor-
tance for the development of the shadow economy and emphasizes the change in the attitude of the
economic agents towards the institutions and the legislation, especially in the transition countries.
For the last three years the development of the Bulgarian economy has been characterized
by macroeconomic stability and financial soundness. At the same time the state has extended con-
trol over business activities by increasing the number of the legal regulations concerning licens-
ing, permissions and registration. Current licensing and registration procedures impede business ac-
tivity and create favorable conditions for corruption in state and local administration. Surveys of
the Institute for Market Economy show that business regulation and the constantly changing num-
ber of regulations are important reasons for firms to prefer the informal sector of the economy.
In theory and practice the most common methods for measuring the shadow economy are the following:
The direct approach is based on a direct inquiry with the firm managers, state and lo-
cal administration representatives by means of interviews and questionnaires. An advantage of
this method is the variety of the information collected about the structure of the shadow econ-
omy, and the incentives that lead to it. The outcome of such research depends on the way
the questionnaire is formulated and the willingness of the businessmen to give truthful answers.
The disadvantage of the approach is the degree of reliability of the information given the ille-
gal nature of many shadow activities. This presents difficulties for estimation of the actual size
of the shadow economy. For this reason, the direct approach is not much used in practice.
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